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Abstract: 
In this paper, we develop a Listian model of economic development. The economy consists of a 
primary sector and a potential industrial sector that can arise via industrialization. 
Industrialization however depends on if the primary sector specializes on the primary product, 
which can lead to a division of labor between the primary and the industrial sector. In this 
case, the industrial sector will use a modern technology to produce industrial goods. If such 
does not occur, the primary sector continues to produce all goods with a traditional 
technology of production. In addition, the industrial sector has to decide if it concentrates 
production in one location or if it disperses production in two locations. We show that the 
level of transport costs matters for division of labor and for the degree of manufacturing 
agglomeration if and only if the refinement of the primary input is strong, i.e., if the raw 
material loses a lot of weight through industrial transformation. Otherwise, if the industrial 
process is not so much “weight-losing”, industrialization can begin with a decentralized 
symmetric spatial pattern independently of the transport costs level. 
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Introduction 
 
Friedrich List is mostly known for the infant industry argument of protection
3
. However, 
everyone that reads his main opus The National System of Political Economy (List, 1841), will 
easily realize that the main focus in List’s philosophy is how to develop economically a nation. 
In particular, List main concern is how a country can transform its economy from an 
agricultural one to an industrial one.  
In this paper, we develop a Listian model of economic development. The economy consists of 
a primary sector and an industrial sector that can potentially arise via industrialization. 
Industrialization however depends on if the primary sector specializes on the primary product, 
which can lead to a division of labor between the primary and the industrial sector. In this 
case, the industrial sector will use a modern technology to produce industrial goods. If such 
does not occur, the primary sector continues to produce all goods with a traditional 
technology of production. In addition, the industrial sector has to decide if it concentrates 
production in one location or if it disperses production in two locations. 
In this sense, this paper combines the ideas of List on economic development with those of 
Adam Smith (1786) on the division of labor, and of Krugman (1991) on economic 
agglomeration
4
.  
Although List recognizes the importance of Adam Smith’s concept of “division of labor”, he 
defends that Adam Smith ignores the idea of “productive power”, i.e.: the potential that a 
country has to develop and industrialize. In other words, a country could for instance abdicate 
of some gains in the present accruing from trade in order to reap the future gains brought by 
economic development and industrialization. 
In the same, way List seems to anticipate the ideas latter developed in spatial economics and 
economic geography. He for example states that:  
“Compare, on the one hand, the value of landed property and rent in a district where a mill is 
not within reach of the agriculturist, with their value in those districts where this industry is 
carried on in their very midst, and we shall find that already this single industry has a 
considerable effect on the value of land and on rent; that there, under similar conditions of 
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natural fertility, the total value of the land has not merely increased to double, but to ten or 
twenty times more than the cost of erecting the mill amounted to; and that the landed 
proprietors would have obtained considerable advantage by the erection of the mill, even if 
they had built it at their common expense and presented it to the miller. […] As it is in the case 
of the corn mill, so is it in those of saw, oil, and plaster mills, so is it in that of iron works; 
everywhere it can be proved that the rent and the value of landed property rise in proportion as 
the property lies nearer to these industries, and especially according as they are in closer or less 
close commercial relations with agriculture. And why should this not be the case with woolen, 
flax, hemp, paper, and cotton mills? Why not with all manufacturing industries? We see, at 
least, everywhere that rent and value of landed property rise in exactly the same proportion 
with the proximity of that property to the town, and with the degree in which the town is 
populous and industrious.” 
Furthermore, List defends that the gains from co-location are specific to the industrial sector. 
The same does not occur in the agricultural sector:  
“Agriculture can only progress, the rent and value of land can only increase, in the ratio in 
which manufactures and commerce flourish; and manufactures cannot flourish if the 
importation of raw materials and provisions is restricted.” 
In this sense, while List clearly argues against protection in agriculture, he seems to defend 
that tariffs on the industrial goods can either be dispensed in the starting stages of 
industrialization or not, depending on if the region has already a sufficient mass of industry to 
promote further industrial development. 
Hence, List takes as a departure point the Adam Smith’s (1776) notion of “occupational” 
division of labor. Let us assume that a productive process, which was formerly achieved by 
undifferentiated workers, is split in heterogeneous tasks, each task being assigned to a 
different worker.  Then, it can be shown that on account of several factors, a strong increase of 
labor productivity follows. This occupational specialization is, in Smith’s own words, “limited by 
the extent of the market”, by the number of workers that can be engaged in the specialization 
process. This set of potential participants is bounded from above by the population density 
and by the state of transport and communication technology. 
By comparison with Adam Smith (1776), Friedrich List focuses the geographical dimension of 
the division of labor. Not only complementary tasks are performed by different workers, but 
4 
 
also they can be done in different regions/countries, which then specialize in heterogeneous 
sets of productive tasks. 
List regards the geographical division of labor as a socially negative phenomenon for two kinds 
of reasons. First, it makes the constraint that market size exerts upon industrialization more 
binding, since upstream and downstream tasks are now performed over long distances in 
different regions or countries. Second, he considers that geographical specialization leads 
inevitably to cumulative development asymmetries across regions and countries.  List’s 
argument is the following.  The separate tasks that result from the division of labor have 
different degrees of “capitalization”, i.e., intensity in the use of capital, both physical and 
human.
5
 Hence, national or regional specialization in subsets of tasks leads to different 
degrees of capital intensity across space. As market forces tend to reward basically physical 
and human capital rather than “raw” labor force, spatial inequalities in “capitalization” will 
reinforce themselves in a cumulative way. 
List then proceeds to enumerate the policy tools that can prevent the geographical division of 
labor to arise, the most obvious one being high tariffs. However, List’s discussion goes far 
beyond an argument in favor of trade protectionism as we shall see ahead. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we describe the basic 
assumptions of the model. Then we introduce the rules of the game of the spatial economy. 
We then derive the equilibrium of the game. We conclude by discussing the main findings. 
  
                                                          
5
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Assumptions of the model 
 
We assume a spatial economy that is described by the following assumptions: 
There are two countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F), that are completely symmetric in number 
of consumers/workers, land endowment and available technologies of production.  
The economy entails the production of an agricultural (or “primary”) good, which is 
transformed to give a manufactured composite consumer product. The two goods are strictly 
complementary in production, in the sense that there is a fixed proportion between the rate of 
output of agriculture and manufacture. W. l. g., we assume that this proportion is “one to 
one”. 
The technology of agricultural production is constant returns to scale, and we can model it 
through a Cobb-Douglas production function: 
 
1Q AL Sα α−=  (1.1) 
where  
 
 Agricultural output
Productivity parameter
 Labor input
 Land input
 is a parameter such that 0 1
Q
A
L
S
α α
≡
≡
≡
≡
< <
 
We assume that each country has the same fixed amount of agricultural land that is used in 
production. For instance, we may assume that each country contains n farms, each having one 
unit of extent. Hence, each country uses an amount of land S n= . 
By choosing adequate unit measures for the agricultural output, A reduces to unity. 
Furthermore, if the production function (1.1) is divided by S , it becomes 
 q lα=  (1.2) 
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where  
 is the productivity per unit of land
 is the intensity of cultivation, i.e. the amount of labor used per unit of land
Qq
S
Ll
S
≡
≡  
It is then clear that the marginal returns of applying labor to land are decreasing. 
We also assume that the number of farmers, n , is high enough so that they work under 
conditions of perfect competition. The competitive price of the composite consumer good is 
labeled as cp  and is taken by all farmers. 
The technology of transforming the agricultural good in order to produce a consumer good 
depends on the existence of vertical integration between the successive production stages. 
If the agricultural good is processed “in-house” by the farmers themselves, the production 
entails only variable costs, the average labor productivity in refining being labeled θ . Given 
the complementarity between the two tasks, agriculture and manufacture, the intensive (per 
unit of land) production function is given by: 
 { },
l
q Min l l lα αθ= =  (1.3) 
By solving the inequality 
 l lαθ >   
It is easy to realize that production function (1.3) holds if 
 
( )1l αθ −>   (1.4) 
Otherwise, if 
( )1l αθ −< holds, the labor productivity in agriculture exceeds the productivity in 
the task of refining the input. Hence, less than the whole agricultural output can be 
transformed, thus preventing the fixed proportion between the output rates of the two tasks 
to hold. Condition (1.4) is more binding if the productivity of the manufacturing activity θ  is 
low.  
By contrast, if input transformation is vertically disintegrated, it will be performed by a 
monopolist firm with a fixed equipment (a machine) embodying F units of labor in its 
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construction. It is assumed for simplicity that the working of the machine requires no variable 
costs. Hence, the intensive production function that concerns the collaboration of 
independent firms (farmers and a manufacturing factory) is, if we assume that the fixed cost is 
already sunk: 
 { },
l
q Min l lα α= +∞ =  (1.5) 
 
Transport costs of goods within each country are zero. Both the primary input and the 
consumer goods have an “iceberg” transport cost 1τ > . It is necessary to dispatch an amount 
1τ >  from the origin country in order that one unit amount arrives in the host country. We 
also assume that the transport cost is paid by the purchaser, so that a fob mill pricing regime 
holds in this spatial economy. 
 
The rules of the game 
 
In Figure 1, we plot the extensive form of the game that models our spatial economy. 
 
Figure 1: Game in extensive form 
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In words, each competitive farmer decides first whether to transform the agricultural product 
in-house or sell it in the market thus letting another firm to perform the transformation into a 
finished consumer good. All farmers take the same decision concerning vertical integration, 
since they are symmetric. 
If the farmers decide to specialize in agriculture, a manufacturing firm makes the processing. 
This firm makes first a location decision: either to concentrate geographically production by 
setting up only one plant in a country (Country F, w.l.g.) and serving the other market through 
exports; or setting up two plants, one in each country in order to serve the local demand thus 
achieving proximity between production and customers. The former strategy entails positive 
transport costs of the consumer good, while saving on fixed costs if it is compared with the 
latter strategy. 
If condition (1.4) holds, the profit function of the vertically integrated farmer is: 
 ( )cp l w l Rαpi θ= − + −  (2.1) 
Profit function (2.1) implicitly assumes that labor is not divided. The same workers perform 
both productive tasks: land cultivation, with wage rate w ; and agricultural good processing, 
with wage rate equal to θ , the labor productivity in this task. R is the land rent which we 
assume to be earned by the farmers themselves, so that they are also land owners. Since 
farmers work under competitive conditions, the profit is kept at a zero level and land rent can 
be written from (2.1) as 
 ( )cR p l w lα θ= − +  (2.2) 
  
Henceforth, we will assume that the land rent R in (2.2) is the farmer’s payoff in the game 
depicted in Figure 1.  
Let us consider now the outcome of vertical integration by the farmers. By maximizing the rent 
function (2.2) in relation to l  , we obtain the optimal intensity of cultivation *l  : 
 
1
1
* cpl
w
αα
θ
− 
=  + 
  (2.3) 
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The optimal cultivation intensity increases with the competitive price of the consumer good 
and decreases with labor rewards both in cultivation and in processing. Combining (1.3) and 
(2.3), we obtain the productivity per unit of area (or the output of each farm): 
 ( ) 1* * cpq l
w
α
αα α
θ
− 
= =  + 
  (2.4) 
The output of each farm varies similarly to the optimal intensity of cultivation. 
It is also clear that the transformation of the agricultural input is a refinement, in the sense 
that it brings about a loose of volume/weight by the raw material. Hence, if the farmer 
specializes in primary production and is paid a price k for the raw product, the optimal 
intensity of cultivation is 
 
( )
1
10 kl
w
αα − 
=  
 
  (2.5) 
  
In turn, the productivity per unit of area becomes 
 
( )10 kq
w
α
αα − 
=  
 
  (2.6) 
From (2.4) and (2.6), we simplify inequality 
 
* 0q q<   
To get the condition 
 1cp
w k
θ  
> − 
 
  (2.7) 
Usually, we have 
c
p k>  because the former price covers both raw food production and 
transformation, whereas the latter only pays for agricultural costs. Hence, transformation will 
be weight-losing if the labor cost of processing is a significant share of total wage costs. We 
can assume this condition to hold. 
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A monopolist firm now makes the transformation of the input. This change goes together with 
a technological shift in transformation. The unit variable cost of manufacturing, which was 
1 0
θ
>  in the former production regime switches to zero, while a fixed cost 0F >  emerges. 
This latter cost was absent before and its arise means that manufacturing ceases to done in 
the context of a “cottage” and it becomes performed in a large “factory”. 
As it is depicted in Figure 1, the monopolist manufacturing firm has two available locational 
strategies.  
Consider first the strategy that consists in setting up a single plant in the Foreign country in 
order to serve the local market and export back to the Home country. This geographic 
concentration strategy allows the firm to save on fixed costs but incurs on higher transport 
(trade) costs related with moving the consumer goods across the countries. 
The profit function of this concentration strategy is: 
 ( ) ( )1 m mp k Q p k Q Fpi τ= − + − −   (2.8) 
where  
 
 is the fob mill price of the consumer good
 is the fob mill price of the agricultural input
 is the total output of the consumer good in each country
mp
k
Q
  
Since we assume that the two goods (agricultural and manufactured) are complementary, the 
proportion between their rates of output is fixed. Hence, Q  stands for the output of both 
goods. Difference in weight between input and output is reflected in the respective prices, 
 and 
m
k p . 
In profit function (2.8), τ  stands for the “iceberg” transport (trade) cost between the two 
countries. It is necessary to dispatch exactly 1τ > units of a good from the home country so 
that exactly one unit arrives to destination. A share 
1τ
τ
−
 of the sent good is lost in transit. 
We also define the following prices, 
 
 fob mill price
 delivered (full) price
f
d
p
p
≡
≡
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The relation between 
 and f dp p  is given by 
 
 amount dispatched from origin 1
amount arriving to destination
d
d f
f
pp p
p
τ τ= ⋅ ↔ = = >   (2.9) 
In addition, it is assumed that each seller uses a spatial price policy consisting in charging the 
same fob mill price to all its customers. 
 If the industrial firm decentralizes production by setting up two plants, one in each country, 
his profit function is 
 ( )2 2 mQ p k Fpi = − −     (2.10) 
Where ,  and mk p Q  have the same meaning as in (2.8). 
The following stage in the game whose extensive form is plotted in Figure 1 entails the 
selection of prices by the manufacturer both for the intermediate good, k , and for the 
consumer good mp  . We suppose here that the processing firm has two available actions, 
namely, either to behave as a monopolist or exiting the market. 
If the manufacturer intends to be a monopolist, it is aware that it faces elastic demands, in the 
form of a lower bound for the agricultural input and a higher bound for the price of the final 
consumer good. Were these bounds not respected, the competitive farmers would have an 
incentive to switch to vertical integration of primary production and manufacturing, refining 
the input in-house and selling the consumer good directly to the consumers. 
Nevertheless, if the manufacturer sets these limiting prices, it may happen that its profit is 
negative. Then, the refiner has an incentive to exit the market. A non-coordination situation (a 
sort of “poverty trap”) arises, the output of the consumer good being reduced to zero. 
Let us consider first that the manufacturer has previously decided to set up a unique plant in 
the foreign country, thus concentrating geographically the production. Its profit function is 
expressed in (2.8). We have to calculate the prices of the input and the final good,  and mk p  
respectively that maximize its profit, while deterring farmers to return to vertical integration. 
Clearly, each consumer should be able to purchase the manufactured good at a price mp  not 
higher than the competitive price cp  . Hence, mp  fulfills the condition 
12 
 
 c
m
pp
τ
≤   (2.11) 
It appears as self-evident that the monopolist maximizes profits in (2.8) by quoting output 
price as 
 , where 0,  arbitrarily smallcm
pp ε ε
τ
= − >   (2.12) 
Derivation of the limit price for the agricultural product is more involved. Let ( ).R  be the land 
rent as a function of the price that each farmer receives for his output. Then, intermediate 
good price k should lead each farmer to have a rent level at least as high as the level that he 
would get by integrating vertically in the context of a competitive market, i.e. 
 ( ) ( )cR p R k≤  (2.13) 
  
 
 ( ) ( )* *c cR p p q w lθ= − +   (2.14) 
 ( )cR p  is the land rent under vertical integration. * * and q l  are the optimal output and input 
under vertical integration, being given by (2.4) and (2.3), respectively. It is not difficult to 
conclude that the land rent is given by: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
11 1 0c cR p p
w
α
αα α α
θ
−
−
 
= − > + 
  (2.15) 
Moreover, the land rent of a farmer that only cultivates the land and receives a price k  for the 
raw agricultural product can be shown to be: 
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1
11 1 0R k k
w
α
αα α α
−
−
 
= − > 
 
  (2.16) 
Equating (2.15) and (2.16), we have: 
 ( ) ( )cR p R k=   (2.17) 
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We solve this equality for price of the input k  according to the following steps: 
1. Substitute (2.15) and (2.16) into (2.17), and cut the common term ( )1 α−  , yielding: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
1 1
1 11 1
cp k
w w
α α
α αα αα α
θ
− −
− −
   
=   +   
  
2. Take logs and simplifying gives: 
 ln ln ln 1
c
k p
w
θ
α  = − + 
 
  
3. We assume that the productivity of the transformation task is not much higher than 
the reward of the land cultivation task, so that, 1
w
θ
>  but it is small. Then, we can use 
the MacLaurin approximation, i.e., ( )ln 1 , for a small x x x+ ≈  , and obtain: 
 ln ln ck p
w
θ
α≈ −   
4. Taking exponentials, simplifying and solving for k  , we obtain the input price k  that 
solves equation (2.17), 
 c
w
pk
e
θ
α
 
 
 
≈   (2.18) 
Since 1we
θ
α
 
 
  >  , then 
c
k p<  . The manufacturing firm quotes a price k ε+ , 0ε > , 
arbitrarily small, for the intermediate good. This price is lower than the competitive price for 
vertically integrated farms. 
 The output of a farm that only performs agriculture and receives a price slightly higher than 
(2.18) for its output is, by analogy with (2.6) , close to 
 
1kq
w
α
αα − 
=  
 
  (2.19) 
Substituting (2.18) in (2.19), the farm output becomes 
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( )1
c
w
pq
e w
α
α
θ
α
α
−
 
 
 
 
 
=
  
 
  (2.20) 
Since each country has n  farms, the output of the consumer good in both the Home and 
Foreign countries will be 
 
( )1
c
w
pQ nq n
e w
α
α
θ
α
α
−
 
 
 
 
 
= =
  
 
  (2.21) 
Then, we have seen before in (2.8) that the profit function of a monopolist manufacturer that 
sets a single plant in the Foreign country is: 
 ( ) ( )1 m mp k Q p k Q Fpi τ= − + − −   
   
Where the first term stands for operating profits in the Home country, the second term 
represents profits in the Foreign country (where the single plant is located) and the third term 
is minus the fixed cost. This profit function may also be written as: 
 ( )1 2 1mQ p k Fpi τ= − + −     (2.22) 
Plugging expressions (2.12), (2.18) and (2.21) into the profit function (2.22), the latter becomes 
 
( )
( )
1
1
2 1c c c
w w
p p p
n F
e w e
α
α
θ θ
α α
α
pi τ
τ
−
   
   
   
    
    
= − + −         
   
Dividing by 2n  , we obtain the profit per inhabitant/farmer: 
 
( )
( )
1
1
1
21 1
2 2 2
c c c
w w
p p p F
n n
e w e
α
α
θ θ
α α
αpi
pi τ
τ
−
   
   
   
    
    ≡ = − + −         
  (2.23) 
Henceforth, we adopt the notation, 
  , 1, 2
2
i
i i
n
pi
pi ≡ =   (2.24) 
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Hence, ipi  stands for the per capita profit generated by a monopolist that sets up a number i  
(either one or two) of plants. 
Consider now the subgame where the manufacturer has previously decide to establish two 
plants, so that its profit function is given by (2.10), 
 ( )2 2 mQ p k Fpi = − −     
In this case, 
 and Q k  are still given by (2.21) and (2.18), while the fob mill price of the final 
good is now equal to 
c
p  since customers live in the neighborhood of a plant.  Thus, the 
aggregate profit of a manufacturer that achieves proximity to consumers is  
 
( )1
2 2 2c cc
w w
p p
n p F
e e
α
α
θ θ
α α
α
pi
−
   
   
   
   
   
= − −
   
   
  
Dividing 2pi  by 2n  , we obtain the profit per inhabitant as: 
 
( )1
2
2
2
c c
c
w w
p p Fp
n n
e e
α
α
θ θ
α α
αpi
pi
−
   
   
   
   
   ≡ = − −
   
   
  (2.25) 
 
Finding the equilibrium of the game 
 
The class of games depicted in Figure 1 contains purely sequential, perfect information games, 
whose subgame perfect equilibrium (SGPE henceforth) can be found very simply by means of 
backward induction.  
We will reduce this class of games to one defined over three parameters: 
• θ ≡  labor productivity in the refinement of the agricultural input when the 
processing is made by the farmers themselves, under vertical integration. 
• 
2
FF
n
≡ ≡  per capita (“per farmer”) fixed cost whenever transformation of the 
input occurs under vertical disintegration.  
• 1τ >  , “iceberg” transport (trade) costs across the two countries. 
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The following specifications of other parameters are made: 
 
1
2
α =   (3.1) 
 1
c
p =   (3.2) 
 1w =   (3.3) 
We also give another form to parameter θ , through defining   
 
2we e
θ θ
α
δ
   
   
   ≡ =   (3.4) 
It can be seen very easily that δ  has the following properties: it is greater than 1, it is strictly 
increasing and convex in θ  . 
δ  can be directly interpreted as the “refining rate”, thus given the number of physical units 
(e.g., weight units) of the input should be consumed in processing on order to yield one unit of 
the final good. 
This can be understood easily if we bear in mind the definition of the price of the intermediate 
good, k , in (2.18), together with definition (3.2), as we have than 
 
amount of input consumed
amount of consumer good manufactured
wcp e
k
θ
α
δ
 
 
 
= = =   
With the numerical specifications  (3.1), (3.2), (3.3) and the definition made in (3.4), it is clear 
that the profit function  of a manufacturer that sets only one plant (written in (2.23) simplifies 
to 
  1
1 2 1
4
Fτpi δ τ δ
+ 
= − − 
 
  (3.5) 
If the manufacturer opts by settling two plants, then its profit function (written in (2.25)) 
simplifies to  
  2
1 11 2
2
Fpi δ δ
 
= − − 
 
  (3.6) 
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Since we have a class of games defined in three parameters and two-dimensional plots allow 
only to examine game situations in two parameters, we have chosen to assign two different 
values for the “iceberg” transport cost τ . 
In empirical studies, it is usual to estimate trade costs as a 20% share of total exports or 
imports value. Hence, we will assume first that 
 
1 1 5
5 4
τ
τ
τ
−
= ↔ =   (3.7) 
5
4
τ =  will be taken as the “normal” or “low” level for transport (trade) costs. By contrast, if 
trade relations between the countries deteriorate, the trade cost will be raised to the double 
of the level shown in (3.7), i.e. 
 
1 2 5
5 3
τ
τ
τ
−
= ↔ =   (3.8) 
The case with low transport (trade) costs. 
 
Substituting 
5
4
τ =  in profit function (3.5), condition 1 0pi >  is regarded to mean the same as 
  2
32 45
80
F δ δ
−
<   (3.9) 
Furthermore, considering profit function (3.6), condition  2 0pi >  is equivalent to  
  2
1
4
F δ δ
−
<   (3.10) 
Let us assume now that  1 2 and pi pi  are both positive. Bearing in mind (3.5) and (3.6), with 
5
4
τ =  , condition  2 1pi pi>  can be seen to mean that 
  2
8 5
80
F δ δ
+
<   (3.11) 
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Figure 2 depicts the regions where inequalities (3.9), (3.10) and (3.11) are satisfied in 
parameter space ( ), Fδ  for low transport costs 54τ =   .  
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The case with high transport (trade) costs 
 
We now deal with the case with high transport (trade) costs, where 
5
3
τ =  . Substituting this 
value of τ  in profit function (3.5), the per capita profit of a firm setting up a unique plant is 
  1 2
3 2
10 3
Fpi δ δ= − −   (3.12) 
The profit of a manufacturer which establishes two plants is still given by (3.6), since no 
transport costs are incurred here. 
The condition 1 0pi >  is seen to be equivalent to 
  2
9 20
30
F δ δ
−
<   (3.13) 
Condition  2 0pi >  is still equivalent to (3.10). Moreover, condition  1 2pi pi<  has the same 
meaning as 
  2
6 5
30
F δ δ
+
<   (3.14) 
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Figure 3 shows the regions where inequalities (3.10), (3.13) and (3.14) are satisfied in 
parameter space ( ), Fδ  for high transport costs 53τ =   . 
 
Transport costs and the degree of industrial transformation as causes 
of industrial agglomeration 
 
In this subsection, we assess the impact of transport costs and the degree of input refinement 
on the spatial concentration of manufacturing. Taking into account the profit function in (3.5) 
concerning the case where a single plant is set up by the industrial firm, we have 
   
  1
1 2 1
4
Fτpi δ τ δ
+ 
= − − 
 
  (3.15) 
The partial first derivative of 1pi  in relation to the transport cost “iceberg” rate,τ , is negative 
 
1
2
1 2 1 0
4
pi
τ δ τ δ
∂  
= − + < ∂  
  (3.16) 
This result is natural since decreasing transport costs raises the profit of concentrating 
production in a single point in space. If we compute the cross partial derivative in relation to 
δ  , we obtain 
 
1
2 2
1 1 1 0pi
τ δ δ τ δ
∂  
= + > ∂ ∂  
  (3.17) 
Consequently, increasing the refining rate δ dampens the negative effect that increasing 
transport costs has upon the profit of a firm, which transacts its input and output across 
countries.  
We can rationalize (3.17) by recalling that, under the “iceberg” technology, transport costs are 
amounts of goods (both manufactured goods and raw materials) that are “lost in transit” 
between production and consumption sites. Consequently, increasing the “refining rate”, δ  ,  
decreases the amount of  input that must be carried between the farm and the factory in 
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order to produce one unit of manufactured good. For a given “iceberg” rate, τ  , it also 
decreases the amount that is “lost in transit” 
Another way of expressing this is to say that the transport cost of the input outweighs the 
freight cost of the manufactured product, since the industrial process consists in “refining” a 
raw material, converting it in a “lighter” product. As we have seen before, the transport cost of 
the input is ( )1k τ −  . Since k  , the fob mill price of the input, decreases with δ  (see (2.18) 
and (3.4)), the total transport cost decreases with the “refining rate”, δ  . 
Hence, rising the degree of industrial transformation also favors the agglomeration of 
manufacturing in a single plant, in a single country, thus making a geographical division of 
labor to emerge.  
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Main conclusions 
 
Four main conclusions arise: 
a) Division of labor, both occupational and geographical, is caused by low transport costs 
(low τ ) and high population density (high n ). Together these two factors bound the 
“extent of the market” from above, i.e., they limit the number of workers that are 
potentially available to engage in a specialization process
6
. 
b) Geographical division of labor, i. e., concentration of manufacturing in a single plant in 
a single country, implies both low transport costs (low τ ) and intermediate population 
density (intermediate n ). If density is too small, there will be no vertical 
disintegration. By contrast, if the number of inhabitants in each country is too high, 
the industrial output will be produced in both countries. 
c) The size of “iceberg” transport costs depends on two factors: the rate of the 
intermediate good “lost in transit”, 1τ − , and its price k . This price is inversely 
related with the “refining rate” δ  (see (2.18) and (3.4)), because this is the number of 
input units that must be used to produce one unit of consumer good with a fixed 
parametric price. If δ  is low, then k  will be high, so that transport costs will be high 
independently of the transport rate τ . Consequently, if the “refinement rate” is low, 
manufacturing can start in each country even if transport costs are low. 
d) A normative conclusion, stressed by Friedrich List himself, is that geographical division 
of labor is socially negative. Indeed “Proximity” yields a higher agricultural output for 
each farm and country than “Concentration”. The reason is that “Concentration” is 
economical if and only if transport costs are low, as it implies moving inputs and 
outputs across countries. “Concentration” is more profitable than “Proximity” as a 
location strategy for the monopolist provided that transport costs and the price k of 
the raw material are low. The latter condition implies a low intensity of land cultivation 
and a small agricultural output in each farm and country. Furthermore, the land rent 
expressed in (2.16) decreases with k  and becomes lower if the manufacturer installs 
only one plant. 
                                                          
6
 Amador and Caldeira Cabral (2014) observe that after 2003 Portugal had a sustained surge in exports, 
which cannot be easily explained, since the Euro was strong and the oil prices were on the rise. Our 
result that a reduction in trade costs conduces to a division of labor between the primary sector and the 
industrial sector, can help to explain this occurrence. In fact, in 2003, the EU’s Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP) shifted from product support to producer support, which in practice conduce to a reduction 
in the level of protection in the agricultural sector (European Commission, 2012). 
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Discussion 
 
In this paper, we have developed a Listian model of economic development, where the 
economy is made up of an primary sector that produces good using a traditional technology 
and an industrial sector that can arise if the primary sector specializes in the primary good, i.e.: 
if division of labor arises in equilibrium. If division of labor does not occur, the economy is 
stuck in an underdevelopment trap. If division of labor does occur, which is limited as in Adam 
Smith by the “extent of the market”, industrialization can arise with either industrial dispersion 
or agglomeration, i.e., either with or without geographical division of labor. 
Geographical labor division is seen to arise if transport costs are low and the “refining rate” in 
manufacturing is high. The latter condition implies that the price of the agricultural input is 
low, thus diminishing the intensity of its cultivation. In this case, both sectors in the economy – 
agriculture and manufacturing – will produce smaller outputs than those that would prevail if 
industrial production were decentralized between the two countries. 
Otherwise, if the industrial process is not so much “weight-losing”, industrialization can begin 
with a decentralized symmetric spatial pattern independently of the transport costs level. 
In future work, we wish to look at one of the most innovative ideas by List: economic agents 
have incomplete information about trade costs, especially in what concerns trade costs in 
international trade. The “randomness” of trade costs can arise because of disruptions in 
international trade. These disruptions can be caused for example in extreme cases by wars or 
environmental disasters (such as the one in the nuclear plant in Fukushima that putted at risk 
the “just in time” system of production of Japanese manufacturers). But the disruptions in 
international trade can also be due to more “normal” causes such as different legal systems, 
different institutions, or even different culture and language that makes international trade 
rules more uncertain. 
This line of research is in our opinion very promising, in particular for two reasons. First, to our 
knowledge there is very little research on the effects of uncertain trade costs on economic 
activity, trade, and location of production. Second, the randomness on trade costs can in our 
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view help to partially explain one of the most important puzzles in international and 
macroeconomics: the border puzzle
7
. 
The “border puzzle” refers to the empirical evidence that equally distant regions, trade much 
more with each other, even after correcting for trade barriers, if they are located in the same 
country than if they are located in different countries. For instance, McCallum (1995) finds that 
in 1988, trade between Canadian provinces was 2,200 percent larger than the trade between 
U.S. states and Canadian provinces.  
In this way, a border between two countries might just introduce an uncertainty that reduces 
international trade across borders. In future work, we will try to verify this assertion. 
 
  
                                                          
7
 Obstfeld and Rogoff (2001) defend that the border puzzle is one of the six puzzles of open economy 
macroeconomics. 
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